

**SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ON SOVIET-SATELLITE
RELATIONS: SEPTEMBER -- 19 DECEMBER 1956**

1. Since October 1956 there have been press reports of alleged Chinese Communist support of the Polish Communists against Moscow dictation. Particularly since Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt in November, there has been intense interest in the Chinese Communist position on the proper conduct of Soviet-satellite relations. The Chinese attitude was eventually spelled out in detail in a 14,000 word 28 December statement following an enlarged meeting of the Politburo of the CCP. That document is a major statement of what the Chinese consider proper policy for the bloc and for other Communist parties. An interpretation dated 10 January has been forwarded separately.* It should be referred to for a comprehensive view and appraisal of the Chinese position.

2. Attached as supplementary background data is a paper which brings together evidence available up to 19 December 1956, just before the comprehensive Chinese statement. It constitutes the available record of the Chinese attitude while it was evolving, and of Polish and Yugoslav interpretations of that attitude. The evidence is of two main types:

a. Official Chinese Communist statements including:

- (1) A 1 November comment on the key Soviet 30 October 1956 statement on Soviet-satellite relations.
- (2) A 4 November Peking People's Daily editorial supporting the use of Soviet troops in Hungary.
- (3) A 14 November People's Daily editorial defending the Soviet Army action.
- (4) A 21 November People's Daily editorial commenting on the outcome of the Polish-Soviet talks which ended 18 November.

* "'More on the Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat' As An Expression of The International Communist Party Line For 1957".

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(5) A 6 December People's Daily comment on the Soviet-Rumanian talks completed 3 December.

(6) The fact of the People's Daily reprint of Tito's 11 November Pula speech criticizing the Soviet system, and Soviet responsibilities for conditions in Hungary which led to the revolt.

b. Polish and Yugoslav interpretations of the Chinese view of the proper method of conducting Soviet-satellite relations. These include:

(1) Reports from Polish Communist sources by New York Times' reporter Sydney Gruson.

(2) Sensitive and/or diplomatic reports of the Polish Communists' interpretations:

(a) of alleged private statements by high Chinese Communists, and

(b) of the public Chinese Communist pronouncements referred to above.

3. Caution should be exerted in accepting at face value Polish Communist reports of alleged conversations with Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai in Peking. Interpretations of the Chinese attitude as stated by Polish and Yugoslav Communists also should not be accepted at their face value as in fact reflecting the Chinese view. One reason is the possibility of confusion due to time, space and language factors; more important, both the Poles and Yugoslavs have made an effort to portray the Chinese as supporting them against the Kremlin and Polish Communists used Chinese quotations to argue that their own CP leaders should allow more intellectual freedom. This portrayal seems to have been distorted; none of these groups got much comfort from the 28 December statement, which attacked Tito and praised the Poles chiefly for curbing expression of anti-Soviet sentiments.

4. Where there might appear to be any conflict between the interpretation in this attachment and the interpretation given in the more

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comprehensive 10 January 1957 paper, the views therein should be given more weight, as they reflect broader evidence from the Chinese document itself and from subsequent communiques resulting from Chou En-lai's visit to Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest in January. In particular, and in spite of frequent references to equality in relations between Socialist states and to the necessity of avoiding "mechanical" adaptations of the Soviet model (quoted at length in this attachment) the Chinese Communists are believed to be opposed to "liberalization" for the present--whether in terms of a loosening of Moscow reins on satellite CPs or in terms of domestic policy in Hungary, Poland or the other satellites. The essence of the 28 December statement is the urgent necessity for (a) Bloc solidarity under CPSU direction, and (b) a return to the basic principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat. What their views will be when and if stability is thought to be achieved within the Bloc can only be speculation. They are apparently reserving the right to comment in the future.

5. The Chinese decision to emphasize fundamentals such as unity of the Communist movement and the validity of the Communist system apparently derived from an appreciation of the developments to which "liberalization" can lead--as shown by the Hungarian revolt--which shook the foundations of the Communist system. Chinese opposition to "liberalization" stemmed from the time of the Hungarian revolt. Although according to Polish Communists, Mao claims to have told Moscow in October he opposed the use of Soviet troops in Poland (New York Times, 11 January 1957), the Chinese were quick to approve Soviet Army suppression of the Hungarians, and from then on, although continuing to criticize "great nation chauvinism", Peking also warned against the dangers of nationalism on the part of small nations. The difference in tone of referenced paper and that of this analysis may reflect a change in the Chicom stand between October and December.

6. With the above caveats, the attached paper should be useful as a collection of evidence of the Chinese attitude--October-December 1956. It is for U.S. government officials only. Recipients are requested to advise the usefulness of the attached and of the 10 January paper on the Chinese Politburo's statement, and whether a third chapter--an interpretation of the effects of Chou En-lai's January 1957 visit to Moscow, Warsaw and Budapest--would be of interest.

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